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INTRODUCTION
D espite the much criticized dicta o f  Pigeon J .  in J .  Nunes Diamonds Ltd. 
v. Dominion Electric Protection Co.' to the effect that tortious liability is in­
applicable to parties in a contractual relationship in the absence o f  some 
independent tort unconnected  with the perform ance o f  that contract, re­
cent years have witnessed the expansion o f  tortious liability between con­
tracting parties and the recognition o f  concu rrent liability in contract and 
tort in many circum stances.2 O ften  it will make no practical d ifference 
w hether concu rrent liability is available. In som e circum stances, however, 
the distinction between tort and contract may be o f critical significance. In 
particular, im portant lim itations consequences may flow from  a character­
ization o f  the p la in tiff  s cause o f  action as one in contract or as one in tort.
T h is  paper will not delve into the circum stances in which concurrent 
causes o f  action are open to a plaintiff. It will focus instead upon the
'[1972 ] S .C .R . 769 , at 777-778 .
2E.G. Dominion Cham Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Construction Co. Ltd. (1976), 12 O .R . (2d) 201 (C .A .), a f fd  without
considering this point, sub nom. Giffels Associates Ltd. v. Eastern Construction Co. Ltd.. [1978] 2 S.C .R . 1346;
Dabous v. Zulian et. al. (1976), 12 O .R . (2d) 23 0  (C .A .); Husk\ Oil Operation Ltd. v. Oster (1978), 87 D.L.R.
(3d) 86  (Sask. Q .B .) ; Corporation o f  District o f  Surrey v. Car.otl-hatch &  Associated Ltd., [1979] 6  W .W .R. 289
(B .C .C .a  jacobson Ford-Mercury Sales Ltd. v. Sivertz (1970), 103 D .L .R . (3d) 480  (B.C..S.C .); Canadian Western
Natural Gas Co. Ltd. v. Pathfinder Surveys Ltd. (1980), I f  Alta. L .R . (2d) 135 (C .A .); Viscount Machine &  Tool
Ltd. v. Clarke (1981 ), 34 O .R . (2d) 752  (H .C .). T h* recent Canadian developm ents have been heavily 
influenced by English decisions, such as Esso Petrolei m Co. Ltd. v. Mardon, [1976] Q .B . 801 (C.A.), Ratty v.
Metropolitan Property Realizations Ltd., [1978] Q .B . 55 4 (C .A .), Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs Cjf 
Kemp, [1979] 1 Ch. 384 and Ross v. Counters, [198( ] 1 Ch. 297. T h e re  has also been a mass o f  academic 
writing on the subject. T h e  following articles are v>me o f  the m ore im portant: W .D .C. Poulton, "T o rt or 
C ontract” (1966 ), 82 L.Q. Rev. 3 4 6 ; C .J.F . Kidd, "Y h e  N egligent Professional Advisor: Can the Client Sue 
in T o rt?” (1976 ), 9  U. Qld. L.J. 2 5 2 ; G .H .L . Fridm an, “T h e  Interaction of T o rt and C ontract" (1977), 93 
L.Q. Reii. 4 2 2 ; C. Considine, "Som e Im plications from  Recent Cases on the D ifferences between Contract 
and T o r t” (1978 ), 12 U.B.C.L. Rei’. 85 ; J .F .  Keeled, “Paying for Mistakes —  Professional N egligence and 
Econom ic Loss" (1979), 53  >4us. L.J. 4 1 2 ; J .  Irvine, “C ontract and T o rt : Troubles Along the B o rd er" (1979),
10 C.C.L.T. 2 8 1 ; B. M organ, "T h e  N egligent C o n traci-B reak er” (1980), 58 Can. Bar Rn'. 299 ; B .J. Reiter, 
"Contracts, T o rts, Relations and R eliance" in B .J . Reiter and J .  Swan, Studies in Contract Law  (1980) 235- 
311 ; R .J. Sutton and M.A. M ulgan, "C ontract and T o r t” [1980] N.Z.L.J. 366.
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dif ferences, f rom  the standpoint o f  lim itation o f  actions, between suing in 
contract and suing in the tort o f  negligence. It will be seen that it is generally 
advantageous for a p la in tiff to sue in tort if  such a course is open to him. 
T h e  fram ing o f  a cause o f  action may be relevant from  a lim itations p er­
spective eith er because a d ifferent lim itation period is applicable in contract 
and tort or m ore likely because the lim itation period runs from  a d ifferent 
point in tim e in contract and tort. T h e  second part o f  this paper will discuss 
briefly the d ifferences in lim itation periods. Most o f  the problem s which 
have arisen, however, concern  the date on which the relevant lim itation 
period should com m ence. Most lim itations statutes state vaguely that time 
starts to run from  the date the cause o f  action arose. T h e  third , and most 
im portant section o f  this paper, th erefo re , will deal with thfe date o f  accrual 
o f  causes o f  action in contract and tort. A particularly acute problem  in 
this context is w hether a p la in tiffs  cause o f  action can be statute-barred 
before he discovers, or could reasonably have discovered, that he has such 
a cause o f  action, as for exam ple, where any dam age su ffered  is latent. 
T h e  final part o f  this paper will exam ine briefly statutory reform s which 
have been im plem ented or proposed to rem edy the problem  o f  the hidden 
cause o f  action.
DIFFERENT LIMITATION PERIODS IN CONTRACT 
AND TORTIOUS NEGLIGENCE
Various provincial statutes em body an array o f  lim itation periods in 
the contractual and tortious areas. As a starting point, the statutes em ploy 
the same basic lim itation periods for actions in contract and tortious neg­
ligence and that period is six years from  the tim e the cause o f  action 
accrued .3 A lberta,4 British C olum bia,5 M anitoba,6 Prince Edward Island,7 
and Saskatchew an” all have a special two-year period for personal injury 
claims. W hereas in A lberta, British Colum bia and M anitoba, it is clear that 
the two-year period em braces both contractual and tortious claims for per­
sonal in juries, it is still an open question in Prince Edward Island and 
Saskatchewan w hether contractual claims are covered by the special period. 
T h e  answer to that question depends upon w hether the phrase “injury to
*Limitation o f Actions Act, R .S.A . 1980, c. L -15 as am .. s.4( l)(c)(g); Limitation Act, R .S .B .C . 1979, c. 23 6  as 
am ., s. 3 (4); The Limitation of Actions Act R .S.M . 1970, c. L 150  as am ., s. 3 ( l) (g ) (l) ;  Limitation of Actions Act, 
R .S.N .B . 1973, c. L-8, s. 9 ; The Limitation o f  Actions (Personal) and Guarantees Act, R.S.N . 1970, c. 20 6  as am ., 
s. 2 ; The Statute of Limitations, R .S .N .S. 1967, c. 168 as am ., s. 2(1 )(e); Limitations Act, R .S.O . 1980, c. 240 , 
s. 4 5 (l)(g ); Statute of Limitations, R .S .P .E .l. 1974, c. S-7 as am ., s. 2(1 )(g); The Limitation of Actions Act, R .S.S. 
1978, c. L -15 as am ., s. 3( 1 )(e)(f)(J)-
'R .S .A . 1980, c. L -15 as am . ss. 51(b) and 52.
■R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 2 3 6  as am ., s. 3(1 )(a).
-R .S .M . 1970, c. L I 50  as am ., s. 3 (l)(d ).
7R .S .P .E .I. 1974. c. S-7 as am ., s. 2 (l)(d ).
"R.S.S. 1978, c. L-15 as am., s. 3(l)(d).
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the person . . . from  an unlawful act” is broad enough to countenance ac­
tions for breach  o f  contract. A lberta,9 British  C olum bia10 and M anitoba" 
also have a special two-year period for claim s for property dam age. Only 
the British Colum bia statute makes it clear that this period extends to 
actions for breach o f  contract. N one o f  the statutes m entions specifically 
tortious claim s for purely econom ic loss. Such actions must presum ably be 
brought within six years o f  the accrual o f  the cause o f  action pursuant to 
the various catch-all provisions in the respective statutes.
T h e  similarity in lim itation periods in contract and tort has m eant that 
the length o f  the lim itation period alone will not norm ally be a significant 
factor in a p la in tiff’s choice o f  his cause o f  action where he is free to make 
such a choice. O ne exceptional case in this regard was Paramuschuk v. Town 
of Meadown Lake.12 In that case, the two plaintiffs m ade a contract with the 
defend ant m unicipality whereby the defend ant agreed to build a drainage 
ditch across the p laintiffs’ lands. T h e  defend ant failed to construct such a 
ditch with the result that the p laintiffs’ lands were flooded destroying their 
crops. T h e  d efend ant argued that part o f  the plaintiffs’ claim s were statute- 
barred  by what was then section 58 6  o f  the Town Act.™ T h a t section provided 
in part that “in cases not otherw ise provided for, no action shall be brought 
against the town for the recovery o f  dam ages after the expiration o f  three 
m onths from  the date when the dam ages were sustained”.
T h e  C ou rt held that the section applied to actions brought in tort but 
did not apply to actions brought in contract, which were subject to the 
general lim itation period o f  six years. Accordingly the first plaintiff, who 
fram ed her action in contract was not barred  from  suing by section 586. 
T h e  second plaintiff, however, who sued in tort, was statute-barred.
DIFFERENT COMMENCEMENT DATES FOR THE 
RUNNING OF LIMITATION PERIODS IN CONTRACT AND 
TORTIOUS NEGLIGENCE
Som e lim itation provisions, as, for exam ple, those directed at medical 
and dental practitioners, lay down a specific com m encem ent date, such as 
the date on which professional services term inated in the m atter which was 
the subject o f  the com p lain t.14 In those cases, it is clear that the com m ence­
''R .S.A . 1980, c. L -15 as am ., s. 51 (f).
" ’K .S .B .C . 1979, c. 236  as am ., s. 3(1 )(a>.
"R .S .M . 1970, c. L I 50  as a m , s. 3 ( l) ( f ) .
,2( 1964), 47 D .L .R . (2d) 427  (Sask. C .A .). 
n R.S.S. 1953, c. 138.
HFor exam ple. Limitation of Actions Act, R .S.A  1980, c. L -15  as am ., s. 55 ; The Statue o f Limitations, R .S.N .S. 
1967, c. 168 as am ., s. 2( 1 )(d). For an excellent discussion o f  the privileged position ol the medical profession 
in this context, see J  P.S. M cLaren, “O f  Doctors, Hospitals and Lim itations —  'T h e  Patient's D ilem m a'" 
(1973) 11 Osgoode H all L.J. 85.
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m ent date and the special (shorter) lim itation period laid down are appli­
cable regardless of w hether the p lain tiff fram es his action in contract or 
in to rt .15
In general, however, lim itation statutes o ffer  little assistance in d eter­
m ining exactly when tim e starts to run. T h e  relevant date is that on which 
the cause o f  action arose or accrued. It falls to the courts to determ ine the 
tim e o f  the accrual o f  causes o f  action in contract and tortious negligence. 
T h e  classic general statem ent o f  when a cause o f  action arises was stated 
by Rose C .J ., in Lewington v. Raycroft:
T h e  req u irem en t that an action m ust be com m en ced within six years after the 
cause o f  action arose m eans that it m ust be com m en ced  within six years after  
the o ccu rren ce  o f  all the facts which the plaintiff m ust prove as part o f  his case, 
that is, that the tim e begins to  run when the plaintiff could first have brou gh t 
an action and proved sufficient facts to sustain it . . ,16
T h e  application o f  this general principle to actions in contract and tortious 
negligence must now be exam ined.
Accrual of a Cause of Action in Contract
It is clear that a cause o f  action in contract accrues at the time o f  
b reach .17 T h e  result o f  this rule is that time may start to run and may even 
exp ire before the p lain tiff su ffers any dam age and certainly before any 
dam age is d iscovered .18 A good exam ple o f  the injustice which can be 
w rought by this rule is the decision o f  the O ntario  C ourt o f  Appeal in 
Farmer v. H . H. Chambers Ltd.19 T h e  defendant constructed a retaining wall 
for the p lain tiff in 1961. T h e  wall collapsed in 1970 and the p laintiff 
com m enced his action within a few m onths o f  the collapse. T h e  C ourt held 
that the p la in tiff was out o f  tim e because the limitation period started to 
run when the wall was com pleted in 1961 in breach o f contract.
T h e re  is also a num ber o f  cases dealing with the liability o f  professionals 
where the breach date rule has caused a plaintiff to be statute-barred before 
he had any reason to sue. In  the early case o f  Short v. McCarthy,'20 for
{bLettre v. Rowe (1981), 130 D .L .R  (3d) 3 79  (Nfld. C .A .).
""11935] O .K . (c. 2) 440 . at 44 2  (H .G.), a f f d  (1935] O .R . 474 (C.A.).
,7For exam ple. Long v. Wrstem Propeller Co. Ltd. (1968), 67  D .L.R. (2d) 345 (Man. C.A.).
‘"T h ere  is o ften  a dispute as to the point in tim e at which dam age is sustained. This dispute will be exam ined 
below in section I I I  B 1.
'“11973] 1 O  R. 35 5  (C.A .).
» (1 8 2 0 ) , 3 B & Aid. 6 2 6 , 106 L.R. 789  (K .B .) See also Brown v. Howard ( 1820), 2  Brod. & Bing. 73, 129 
K.R. 88 5  (C .P .); Howell v. Young ( 1826), 5  B . 4 C .  259 , 108 F..R. 97 (K .B .); Smith v. Fox ( 1848), 6  H are 386. 
67  F..R. 1216 (V .-C .); Hughes v. Tuisden (1886 ), 15 L .J. Ch. 4 8 1 ; Schwebel v. Telekes, [1967] O .R . 541 (C.A.) 
(notary public); Melanson v. l.eger (1798 ), N .B .R . (2d) 632  (Q .B .); Power v. Hailes (1981), 124 D .L.R. (3d) 
350  (NHd. C .A .).
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exam ple, a solicitor was sued in assumpsit for failing to search diligently 
when verifying the title to certain  stock in which his client, the plaintiff, 
wished to purchase an interest. T h e  defective title cam e to light m ore than 
six years from  the tim e at which the d efendant had negligently rendered 
his services. T h e  C ourt held that the p la in tiffs  suit was barred because his 
cause o f  action “accrued from  the tim e o f  th<* breach o f  duty by the d e­
fendant, and not from  the tim e o f  its discovery”.21
A similar conclusion was reached with respect to architects Bagot v. 
Stevens Scanlan &  Co. Ltd.22 T h e  defend ant was em ployed by the p laintiff 
to supervise the construction o f  drains on the p la in tiffs  property. T h e  
contract was com pleted by February i9 5 7  but it was not until the end o f  
1961 that several o f  the pipes in the drainage system broke. It was held 
that the p la in tiff s cause o f  action in contract arose at the latest in February 
1957 with the result that the p la in tiff was out o f  tim e when he sued in 
April 1963.
Som e devices are available to enable courts to avoid the rigours o f  the 
breach date rule. A contractual obligation may, for exam ple, be charac­
terized as a continuing one such that the breach occurs continuously until 
eith er the obligation is perform ed or becom es im possible o f  perform ance. 
Such a conclusion was reached by O liver J .  in Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. 
v. Hett, Stubbs &  Kemp.23 T h e  defendant solicitors drew up an option to 
purchase land in favour o f  one G eoffrey  G reen in M arch 1961. T h e  option 
was exercisable over a ten year period. T h e  defendant, nowever, om itted 
to register G eoffrey ’s interest in the land pursuant to the English Land 
Charges Act, 192524 with the result that his option was defeated by the 
disposal o f  the property in August 1967. G eoffrey  com m enced an action, 
which was continued by his executors, against the defendant in Ju ly  1972 
in both contract and tort. T o  defeat the contractual action, the defendant 
argued that it was under an obligation to register the co tion  within a 
reasonable tim e o f  the d rafting  o f  the agreem ent in M arch 1361 and that, 
th erefo re , the breach occurred  and the cause o f action arose substantially 
m ore than six years before the suit was com m enced. O liver J .  dismissed 
that argum ent and determ ined that the defendant was under a continuing 
obligation to register the option right up until August 1967 when it becam e 
im possible to fulfil that obligation. T h e  p la in tiff s cause o f  action in contract, 
th erefo re , accrued as late as August 1967 and the action was in time.
A court can som etim es find that a defendant has fraudulently con ­
cealed a p la in tiffs  right o f  action. In such a case the lim itation period will
* '(1 8 2 0 ), 3 B .&  Aid. 626 . al 6 3 1 , 106 E .R . 789 , at 791 -792 .
**[1966] 1 Q .B . 197. See also Tmract Board o f  School Trustees v. Berunck et. al. (1963), 38  D .I..R . (2d) 498 
(B .C .S .C .); McLaren Maycroft (jf Co. v. Fletcher Development Co. Ltd.. [1973] 2 N .Z.L.R. 100 (C..A.).
n Supra, footnote 2.
M 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V c. 22.
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not com m ence until the p lain tiff has, or with reasonable diligence ought 
to have, discovered the fraud. Many provincial limitation statutes contain 
general “f raudulent concealm ent” provisions as will be identified in section 
l\r o f  this paper. Such provisions may not be essential, however, because 
there seems to be a doctrine o f  fraudulent concealm ent in equity. T h is 
D octrine was invoked recently in Vienneau v. Solicitor25 to delay the running 
o f  a limitation period against a lawyer being sued for breach o f  contract.
In the m ajority o f  cases a cou rt will be unable to escape from  the 
position that a cause o f  action in contract arises on the date o f  breach and 
that the lim itation period runs from  that time. It should be pointed out, 
however, that there have been a few exceptional cases where the courts 
have held that a cause o f  action in contract arises only when the breach is 
discovered. O ne such case is McBride v. Vacher.2h T h e  plaintiff purchased 
from  the defendant a house in the course o f  com pletion. He later sued for 
a breach o f  the im plied warranty that the house would be com pleted in a 
good, proper and w orkm anlike m anner. T h e  C ourt agreed that the general 
rule was that a cause o f  action in contract dates from  the breach. In  a 
building contract, however, the cause o f  action would not accrue in respect 
o f  latent defects in the property until those defects were, or ought to have 
been, discovered by the plaintiff .
Accrual of a Cause of Action in Tortious Negligence
It is a m uch m ore difficult question to determ ine when a cause o f  
action arises in tortious negligence.27 A uthority can be found for any o f  
three dates, namely the date o f  breach o f  duty, the date o f  su fferin g  the 
consequent dam age or the date o f  discovery o f  such dam age. In many 
cases, such as a typical traffic accident case, these three dates will coincide 
and hence there will be no problem . It is not unusual, however, for a 
considerable period o f  tim e to elapse between each of these dates and, in 
such a situation, it may be vital to d eterm ine which date is the relevant one.
Date of Damage
A fter som e initial doubts, it is now reasonably clear that a cause o f  
action in tortious negligence accrues at the earliest upon the occu rrence o f 
dam age.28 T h e  plaintiff has no right of action beforehand and hence “to 
choose any earlier period would be to leave the p laintiff in the thoroughly
-’"11952) 2 D .L .R . 274  (O nt. C .A .). See also /ntrrmountam School Division No. v. (iadboury, ¡.ussier, Sigurdson
Ù? Venables (1980), H Man. R. (2d) 264 (Q .B .).
27See generall\ |.P.S. M cLaren, “T h e  Im pact ol Lim itation Periods on Ariionabilitv in N egligence" (1969),
7 Alla. I. Rev 247
-'■(1981). N.B.R (2d) ‘¿14 (Q.B.).
-"See McLaren. Ibid.. at 248-252.
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invidious position of not only not knowing that tim e was running but also 
o f  having no substantive claim  to bring within the prescribed period”.29 
T h e  leading decision is that o f  the M anitoba C ourt o f  Appeal in Long v. 
Western Propeller Co. Ltd.™ T h e  plaintiff s were owners o f  and passengers in 
an aircraf t which crashed. T h e y  sued for the property dam age and personal 
in juries sustained in the crash allegedly caused by negligent repairs p er­
form ed by the d efendant. T h e re  was no contractual nexus between the 
parties and the action was launched solely in tortious negligence. T h e  
question arose as to w hether the lim itation periods involved should run 
from  the date when the negligent repairs were carried  out or from  the 
date when the dam age and in juries were su ffered . M ore than fou r years 
had elapsed between the two dates. T h e  C ourt was in doubt that dam age 
was required to com plete the cause o f  action in negligence and that the 
relevant date for lim itation purposes was the date o f  the crash. T o  have 
held otherw ise would have resulted “in the anom aly that the cause o f  action 
o f  the [passengers] was extinguished b efore it arose”. ’1 T h e  relevant M an­
itoba lim itation period for personal in juries was two years and no personal 
injuries had been sustained two years after the perform ance o f  the repairs.
T h e  fact that a cause o f  action in tortious negligence does not accrue 
until the tim e o f  dam age rather than at the time o f  the breach o f  duty 
m eans that, for lim itations’ purposes, it will generally be advantageous for 
a p lain tiff who has a choice to sue in tort rath er than contract. T h e re  has 
been a num ber o f  cases where a finding o f  liability in tort has enabled the 
running o f  a lim itation period to be retarded substantially.32
T h e re  is, however, a body o f  case law, which will be exam ined below,33 
to the effect that, where concurrent causes o f  action in contract and tort 
are open to a p laintiff, he cannot extend a lim itation period by fram ing 
his action in tort rath er than contract. M oreover, the whole concept o f  
concu rrent liability has not been accepted universally and there is still a 
body o f  opinion favouring the view that, if  there is a contract between the 
parties, any action must be brought in contract, in the absence o f  som e tort 
quite independent of that contractual relationship. T h is view is particularly 
strong in the field o f  solicitors’ liability.34
»Ibid., at ‘248.
*°Supra, footnote 17.
^Supra, footnote 17, at 348.
** For exam ple, Lemesurer v. Union Gas Co. of Canada Lid. (1975), 8 O .R . (2d) 152 (H .C .); Midland Hank 
Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs &  Kemp, supra, footnote 2 ; Viscount Machine C7 Too! Ltd. v. Clarke, supra, footnote 
2.
’ ’Section 111 B3.
MFor exam ple, Schwebe! v. Telekes, supra, footnote 20 ; Smith v. Mclnnis, [ 1978) 2 S.C .R . 1357 per Pigeon j. ;  
Messmeo v. Beale (1978), 20  O  R. (2d) 49  (C .A .); Royal Bank of Canada v. Clark (1978), 88  D .I..R  (3d) 76 
(N .B .S .C . App. Div ); Melanson v. Leger, supra, footnote 2 0 ; Page v. Dick (1980), 12 C .C .L . F. 43 (Ont. U .C.)
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Problem s such as these have led two C anadian law reform  bodies to 
recom m end the rem oval o f  disparities between contract and tort w here a 
claim is based on negligence, w hether contractual or tortious. T h e  starting 
point for a lim itation period in such a case should be the occurrence o f  the 
dam age. T h e  running o f  a lim itation period should not depend upon the 
fact that an action is fram ed in tort rath er than contract and, m ore im ­
portantly, two plaintiffs in sim ilar positions should not be treated differently  
merely because in one case th ere is a contract and in the other there is not. 
T h u s, in 1969, the O ntario  Law R eform  Com m ission made the following 
recom m endation:
In cases which are  based on a breach o f  a duty to take ca re , w h ether that duty  
arises in to rt, co n tract o r  by statute, tim e should run from  the o ccu rren ce  o f  
d am ag e .*5
It is not always a sim ple m atter to determ ine the exact date o f  the 
occu rrence o f  dam age. It can and has been argued, for exam ple, that, 
where a solicitor negligently allows his client to advance money on a d e­
fective security, negligently fails to check the title o f  property his client is 
purchasing or negligently drafts an u nenforceable contract, the dam age 
occurs at the tim e when the client receives the defective security, title or 
contract.36 I f  such a view is accepted, then the dam age occurs at the same 
time as the breach o f  duty and the lim itation periods in both contract and 
tort will com m ence ru nning  at the same time. T h is  was the interpretation 
o f  Howell v. Young37 favoured by Lord Pearce in art ledge v. E. Jopling  
Sons Ltd.™ In  Howell, the defend ant solicitor failed to ensure that certain 
m ortgages were adequate security for m oney his client, the p laintiff was 
advancing on a loan. T h e  defendant was sued in both contract (assumpsit) 
and tort (case). T h e  C ourt held that the cause o f  action accrued at the time 
o f  the breach o f  duty and not at the tim e that the p laintiff actually lost 
m oney as a result o f  the deficient securities.
T h e  sam e interp retation  has been suggested fo r other negligent sol­
icitors’ cases.31 Most recently this question was considered by the English 
C ourt o f  Appeal in Forster v. Outred &? Co.40 T h e  p lain tiff claimed that the
’ 'O n tario  Law Reform  Com m ission, “Report on Lim itation of Actions" (1969) 93. See also Alberta Institute 
of Law Research and Reform , “W'orking Paper on Lim itation o f  A ctions" (Ju n e 1977) 4-10.
’•’For exam ple, A.M . Dugdale and K.M . Stanton, Professional Negligence (1982) para. 40 .18 .
,7Supra, footnote 20.
“ [1963] A C. 758 . at 782 -783  (H .L .). See also Oliver. J .  in Midland Bank Trust Co. Lid. v. Hett, Stubbs fc? 
Kemp, supra footnote 2, at 4 0 6 -4 0 7 ; Poulton, supra, footnote 2, at 361 ; Keeler, supra footnote 2, at 428.
,9For exam ple, H .B . Radomski, “Actions against Solicitors —  C ontract or T o rt? "  (1979-81) 2 Advocates' 
Quarterly 160, at 162 in terpreting Schwebel v. Telekes, supra, footnote 20 ; ). H olland J . ,  in Robert Simpson Co. 
Ltd. v. Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. (1981 ), 34 O .R . (2d) 1 (H .C .), in terpreting his own earlier judgm ent 
in Page v. Dick, supra, footnote 34. Mr. justice Hollands' judgm ent was subsequently reversed bv the Court 
o f  Appeal (1982 ), 36  O  R. (2d) 97 .
40( 1982] I W.L.R. 86 (C. A ).
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negligent advice o f  the defend ant solicitors resulted in her m ortgaging her 
house as security for a loan to her son. T h e  m ortgage was executed some 
seven years b efore she brought her action. T h e  case proceeded on the basis 
that the p lain tiff had a cause o f  action in tort as well as in contract. T h e  
defend ant argued that the lim itation period had expired . T h e  plaintiff 
responded that the lim itation period did not start running until dam age 
had been su ffered  and that did not take place until, at the earliest, the 
m ortgagee threatened  to en fo rce  the security by foreclosing on the prop­
erty. T h e  threatened  foreclosure was within the six year lim itation period. 
T h e  C ou rt followed Howell v. Young41 and held that the plaintiff suffered  
dam age as soon as she encum bered her property by executing the m ort­
gage. Dun L .J. said:
In this case, as soon as she execu ted  the m ortgage the plaintiff not only becam e  
liable un d er its exp ress term s but also —  and m ore im portantly —  the value o f  
the equity o f  red em p tion  o f  h er p rop erty  was red u ced . B efo re she execu ted  the 
m ortgage  deed she ow ned the p rop erty  free from  encu m b ran ces; th ereafter she 
becam e the ow ner o f  a p rop erty  subject to a m ortgage. T h a t, in mv view, was a 
quantifiable loss and as from  tbat date h er cause o f  action against her solicitor 
was com p lete , because at that date she had suffered  d am ag e .'2
Sim ilar difficulties have been encountered  in a num ber o f  cases dealing 
with actions relating to defects in real property brought against negligent 
architects, builders and m unicipal authorities for negligent design, su per­
vision, construction or inspection. In Terrace Board of School Trustees v. Ber­
wick,43 fo r exam ple, an action was brought against an architect in both 
contract and tort for the negligent design and supervision o f  the building 
o f  a school which led to the construction o f  a defective roof. T h e  C ourt 
held in part that any cause o f  action in tort accrued when the bad design 
was m ade or the lack o f  supervision occurred  because it was at that time 
that the dam age was done even though it was not discovered until much 
later.
T h e  same suggestion was m ade by Diplock L .J. in Bagot v. Stevens 
Scanlan &  Co. Ltd.44 w here it alleged that the defendant architect had f ailed 
to exercise reasonable care in the supervision o f  the construction o f  a 
drainage system on the p la in tiffs  property with the result that, m ore than 
fou r years later, several o f  the pipes in the drainage system broke with 
consequent dam age to the p la in tiffs  property. Diplock L .J. said:
[I]t seem s to me th at, having reg ard  to the n atu re o f  the duty which is alleged  
to have been breach ed  in this case, nam ely, in effect to see that the drains were 
prop erly designed and built, the d am age from  any breach o f  that duty must 
have o ccu rred  at the tim e when the drains w ere im properly built, because the
42Supra, footnote 40 , at 100.
45Supra, footnote 22. 
u Supra, footnote 22.
i]Supra, footnote 20.
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plaintiff at that tim e was landed with prop erty  which had had d rain s when he 
o u gh t to have been provided with p rop erty  which had good drains and the 
d am age, accord ingly, o ccu rred  on that date. W hat happened later, in 1961 , when 
the settlem ent took place was m erely a conseq uence o f  the dam age resulting  
from  the original breach which o ccu rred  when bad drains w ere installed on the 
plain tiffs p ro p erty .'5
In both Terrace Board of School Trustees v. Berwick and Bagot the primary 
ground for decision was that the arch itect’s sole duty lay in contract and 
that no concu rrent action in tort was available. In this respect, these two 
decisions may have been overtaken by m ore recent events.“’ T h e  finding, 
however, that the occurrence o f  dam age coincided with the breach of duty 
was adopted in later cases where th ere was no contractual nexu s.47
T h e  recent English cases o f  Sparham-Souter v. Town and Country Devel­
opments (Essex) Ltd.** and Anns v. London Borough of Merton19 have signalled 
a retreat from  this developm ent. In  Sparham-Souter, the purchasers of two 
houses which had becom e uninhabitable because o f  defective foundations 
sued the builder and local authority in tort for the negligent construction 
and inspection o f  the foundations respectively. T h e  local authority raised, 
as a prelim inary issue, the question of w hether the claim  was statute-barred, 
relying upon Bagot v. Stevens Scanlan Co.50 T h e  C ourt rejected  the de­
fendant’s argum ent that the dam age was su ffered  and tim e began to run 
when the negligent inspection was carried out and refused to follow the 
dicta o f  Diplock L .J. in the Bagot case. Lord D enning M .R. concluded that 
“when building work is badly done —  and covered up —  the cause of action 
does not accrue, and tim e does not begin to run, until such tim e as the 
p lain tiff discovers that it has done dam age, <Ti tfijgh t with reasonable dil­
igence, to have discovered it.”51
Despite the breadth o f  this statem ent, it is far from  clear that the C ourt 
in Sparham-Souter was saying that a cause o f  action in tort does not arise 
until the dam age is reasonably discoverable. O ne in terp retation  is that the 
decision m erely lays down that in the negligent building cases no dam age 
is sustained until the defective state o f  the property becom es ap p aren t.v- 
T h e  C ourt accepted the validity o f  the House o f  Lords decision in Cartledge
"Ibid.. at 203 .
,bSee cases cited supra, footnote 2.
' Dutton v. Hognor Regis U.D.C., [ 1972] 1 Q .B . 373, at 396-397  (C.A.) per Lord Denning M.R ; Robert Simpson 
(. I. Ltd. v. Foundation Co. o f Canada Ltd., supra note 39  per |. Holland ).
« [1 9 7 6 ] 1 Q .B . 858  (C.A.).
w[ 1978] A.C. 728  (H .L.).
’"Sup-'i, footnote 22.
" Supra, footnote 48 , at 868.
v'S ee  generally English I .aw Reform  C om m ittee, 21st Report (1977  am nd. 69 2 3 ) at 8 -11 ; W infield and 
Jolou’ici on Tort ( 1 1th ed. W .V .H . Rogers 1979) 691 -692 .
\
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v. E .Jop ling  &? Sons Ltd.™ which had rejected  the date o f  discovery principle 
in a case involving personal injuries. Lord D enning M .R. distinguished 
Cartledge on the following basis:
B ut th ere  the d am age to the m an was in fact d o n e when the dust was inhaled 
—  even though it was not discovered till later. H ere th ere  was no dam age to 
any p u rch aser o f  the house until it began to  sink and cracks ap p eared .3'
It is possible, th erefo re , that Sparham-Souter is merely a decision on the 
question o f  when dam age is sustained in a negligent building case. T h e  
later decision o f  the H ouse o f  Lords in Anns v. London Borough of Merton '’' 
does not solve the problem , although it does indicate som e general approval 
o f  Sparham-Souter. O n sim ilar facts, Lord W ilberforce, speaking f or himself 
and Lords Diplock, Sim on and Russell, merely said that the cause o f  action 
can arise only “when the state o f  the building is such that there is present 
or im m inent danger to  the health or safety o f  persons occupying it”. "' Lord 
Salm on considered the problem  m ore fully and treated it as one o f  d eter­
m ining just when the dam age was sustained in these circum stances. He 
rejected  the notion that the dam age was sustained at the time o f  the neg­
ligent act but also re jected  the notion that the cause o f  action arose when 
the dam age was reasonably discoverable. He saw Sparham-Souter as a de­
cision favouring the view that the cause o f  action in negligence accrued 
when the dam age was su ffered . He said that it was possible for the dam age 
to take place before it m anifested itself but that it would be very difficult 
to prove such a fact in a negligent building case.
Date of Discovery of Damage
It has already been noted that there may be a considerable effluxion 
o f  tim e between the date that dam age, however in terp reted , is suffered  
and the date that dam age is, or ought reasonably to have been, discovered. 
I f  the cause o f  action in tortious negligence arises upon the occurrence o f  
dam age, a p lain tiff may find h im self in the unenviable position o f  being 
out o f  tim e before he even knows that he has a cause o f  action. Section IV 
o f this paper will exam ine statutory reform s in this area. T h e  question to 
be determ ined at the m om ent is the extent to which the courts have reacted 
to this problem  so as to delay the running of a lim itation period in tort. If 
it is possible for a cause o f  action to arise only upon the discovery o f  dam age, 
then a p la in tiff who can fram e his action in tort will be in a far superior 
position to one who must rely upon contract. O f  course, if, by statute, a 
lim itation period com m ences at a tim e oth er than the accrual o f  the cause
Supra, footnote 38.
i4Supra, footnote 48 . at 868.
hhSupra. footnote 49.
at 760.
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o f action, such as the date o f  the term ination o f  m edical services, a court 
will have little leeway to deal with the problem  o f  the hidden cause o f  
action.
T h e  leading case o f  Cartledge v. E. Jopling &  Sons Ltd.bl expressly re ­
jected  any principle o f  reasonable discoverability. T h e  plaintiff, while em ­
ployed as a steel dresser for the d efend ant, contracted  pneum oconiosis, an 
invidious disease in which progressive dam age can be done to a person’s 
lungs without his knowledge. It was held that his cause o f  action arose 
from  the date the disease em erged irrespective o f  the fact that he had no 
reason to know at that tim e that he had contracted  such a disease. Lord 
Reid said:
It is now too late fo r the cou rts  to  question o r  m odify the rules that a cause o f  
action accru es as soon as a w rongful act has caused personal injury beyond what 
can be reg ard ed  as negligible, even when that injury is unknown to and cann ot 
be discovered by th e su fferer . . ,58
T h e  issue thus seem ed to have been settled. T h e  am biguous ju d g m en t 
o f  the English C ourt o f  Appeal in the Sparham-Souter case,59, however, re­
opened the whole question. As has been seen, the exact scope o f  that 
decision is unclear. It has, however, spawned a few C anadian cases fa­
vouring the date o f  reasonable discoverability o f  dam age, at least in the 
negligent building area .60 In Robert Simpson Co. Ltd. v. Foundation Co. of 
Canada Ltd.,61 the O ntario  C ourt o f  Appeal in terp reted  Sparham-Souter and 
Anns62 as standing for the following proposition:
W h ere  . . . the p lain tiffs  claim  is based upon work negligently p erform ed  and  
covered  up the cau se o f  action does not accru e , and tim e does not begin to run  
until such tim e as the plaintiff discovers the d am age o r  reasonably ought to  have 
discovered the d a m a g e .65
U nfortunately  the C ou rt implied that the situation might be d ifferent where 
there was a contractual relationship between the parties. T h is  possibility 
will be canvassed fully below.64
blSupra, footnote 38.
"¡but., at 771 -772 . 
b9Supra, footnote 48.
“ For exam ple. Ordog v. District of Mission (1980 ), 110 D .L.R. (3d) 718  (B .C .S .C .); Nielsen v. City o f Kamloops 
(1981), 31 B .C .L .R  311 (C.A .).
6,Supra, footnote 39.
62Supra, footnote 49.
MSupra, footnote 39 . at 108-109.
64Section III B3.
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T h e re  has even been som e m ovem ent towards recognition o f  the prin­
ciple that a cause o f  action in tortious negligence arises upon the discovery 
o f  the dam age in the general area o f  professional negligence, even where 
there is a contract between the parties.65 It must be adm itted, however, 
that th ere are many m ore cases which expressly re ject such a proposition. 
Most recently, the N ew foundland C ou rt o f  Appeal in Power v. Hailey66 relied 
upon the Cartledge case67 to determ ine that in an action against a solicitor 
in tort “tim e runs from  accrual o f  the cause o f  action, w hether known or 
unknow n”.68
Date of Breach of Duty—Concurrent Liability in Contract and Tort
It has been seen that it may be very advantageous fo r a p lain tiff to 
fram e his action, if  possible, in tort rath er than contract so as to delay the 
running o f  a lim itation period at least until the time o f  dam age and perhaps 
until the tim e o f  discovery o f  dam age. It has also been seen that som etim es 
an alternative claim  in tort will prove to be o f  no assistance to a p laintiff 
because dam age is found to have occurred  at the same tim e as the breach 
o f  duty.69
A p la in tiff who wishes to claim  in tort so as to extend a limitation 
period may be m et with a fu rth er problem . T h e re  is a line o f  authority 
which suggests that, even if  an action in tort is available against a defendant 
for the negligent perform ance o f  a contract, the cause o f  action accrues at 
the tim e o f  the breach o f  duty, w hether the p laintiff sues in contract or 
tort. I f  this line is accepted, then a p lain tiff will gain no advantage, for 
lim itation purposes, by fram ing  his action in tort.70
T h is  is one in terp retation  o f  Howell v. Young.'71 Howell was followed in 
this respect by Laskin J .A . in Schwebel v. Telekes,72 which itself was followed 
by McGillivray J .A . in Farmer v. H .H . Chambers Ltd™ M ore recently, the 
N ew foundland C ou rt o f  A ppeal in Power v. Hailey stated the following:
65For exam ple, Jacobson Ford-Mercury Sales Ltd. v. Siverti, supra, footnote 2 ; Viscount Machine &  Tool Ltd. v. 
Clarke, supra, footnote 2.
66Supra, footnote 20.
67Supra, footnote 38.
68Supra, footnote 20 , at 355-356 .
MFor exam ple, Forster v. Outred Co., supra, footnote 40.
70T h e re  are still som e cases which seem to favour the view that, even without any contractual com plications, 
the lim itation period in tortious negligence runs from  the date o f  the breach o f  duty, see Page v. Dick, 
supra, footnote 34.
71Supra, footnote 20.
n  Supra, footnote 20.
7iSupra, footnote 19.
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It has long been established that the cause o f  action o ccu rs and the limitation 
period  starts to ru n , in co n tract, when the breach  o f  co n tract occu rs. W h ere one  
is em ployed by an o th er to p erform  a du ty, the failure to p erform  that duty, or  
negligence in its p e rfo rm an ce , also gives rise to a cause o f  action and, on the 
authorities, the lim itation period runs from  the n o n -p erfo rm an ce  o r  negligence  
and not from  its being discov ered .74
T h e  latest and fullest discussion o f  this issue was given by the O ntario  
C ourt o f  Appeal in Robert Simpson Co. Ltd. v. Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd.15 
T h e  C ou rt exam ined Schwebel v. Telekes76 at som e length and concluded 
that only in situations where the p la in tiff s claim  arose out o f  “a contract 
for personal services requiring  the defend .nt to exercise his special skill 
and knowledge arising out o f  the d efen d an t’s calling”77 did the cause o f  
action in both contract and tort arise at the time o f  the breach o f  duty. In 
other words, the principle was restricted to professional negligence cases. 
In non-professional negligence cases, such as Farm er1* it was still very much 
an open question as to w hether a p la in tiff could delay the running o f  a 
lim itation period by fram ing  his action in tort.
Tw o com m entators79 have recently supported the view that a profes­
sional does not owe two duties to his client, one in contract and one in tort. 
He owes one duty to exercise reasonable care and skill for which he can 
be sued in either contract or tort. T h a t being the case, the cause o f  action 
must accrue as soon as the p lain tiff has the opportunity to sue for a breach 
o f  that duty. T h e  earliest opportunity to sue is upon the breach o f  duty 
because at that tim e the p la in tiff  s cause o f  action in contract is com plete.
It is subm itted, however, that if  courts take the view that, where there 
is a contract between the parties, the cause o f  action in both contract and 
tort must arise at the tim e o f  the breach o f  duty, then they have lost a 
valuable opportunity to protect a p lain tiff against the unfair running o f  a 
lim itation period. T h is  is so even if  Robert Simpson is adopted and the 
principle is restricted to professional negligence cases. Professional negli­
gence will frequently rem ain undetected until, at the earliest, dam age re­
sults. T h e  law reform  bodies o f  both Alberta and O ntario have recommended 
the abolition o f  the Howell v. Young line o f  cases.80
T h e re  are som e decisions which do accept the principle that a p laintiff 
can fram e his action in tort so as to delay the com m encem ent o f  a lim itation
'!iSupra, footnote 20 . at 355 .
7i.Supia , footnote 39.
lbSupra, footnote 20.
77Supra. footnote 39, at 108.
7sSupra, footnote 19.
79Sutton  and M ulgan, supra, footnote 2.
80Supra, footnote 35 and accompanying text.
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period. T h e  most im portant o f  these was Midland Hank Trust Co. Ltd. v. 
Hett, Stubbs Kemp,gi the facts o f  which have already been given,”2 where 
Oliver J . ,  as an alternative ground for decision, held that the p la in tiffs  
action in tort accrued at the tim e that the dam age occurred and not at the 
time o f  the negligent act.85 H e distinguished earlier cases, such as Howell 
v. Young, on the basis that the occu rren ce o f  dam age in those cases coincided 
with the breach o f  duty.84
Finally on this point, the following paragraph from  the latest edition 
o f  Halsbury’s Laws of England  is interesting. T h e  words italicized were added 
to take account o f  the Midland Bank Trust case but, as a result, the paragraph 
makes little sense:
Negligence amounting to breach of contractual duty. W h ere one person is 
em ployed by a n o th er to p erfo rm  a duty and the failure to p erform , or negligence  
in the p erfo rm an ce  of, that duty gives rise to a cause o f  action, tim e runs from  
the date o f  the n o n -p erfo rm an ce  o r  negligence, and not from  its being discovered  
o r from  the o ccu rrin g  o f  d am ag e, unless th ere  was frau dulent concealm ent on 
the d efen d an t’s part o f  the existen ce o f  the cause o f  action, in which case tim e 
runs from  the discovery o f  the frau d , or unless the duty of care arises from the special 
relationship between the parties, when the cause of action accrues at the date of damage.*'3
THE HIDDEN CAUSE OF ACTION — STATUTORY REFORMS
It should be a fundam ental principle o f  the law o f  limitations that time 
should not run against a person whilst he has no reason to believe that he 
has a cause o f  action. It has been seen, however, that, in both contractual 
and tortious actions, such a psssibility is quite a distinct one. T h e  courts 
have been able to grant som e re lie f against injustice but ultimately a sta­
tutory solution is essential.
Som e statutory reform s are already in place. A lberta,86 M anitoba,87 
Prince Edward Island88 and Saskatchew an89 each has a general provision 
in its Lim itations Act to deal with the problem  o f  causes o f  action which 
have been concealed by fraud. Section 7 o f  the M anitoba statute, for ex ­
am ple, provides:
*'Supra, footnote 2. See also Jacobson Ford-Mercurs Sales Ltd. v. Sivertz, supra, footnote 2.
82See text, footnote 23.
"’Contrast Max Garrett (Distributors) Pty. Ltd. v. Tobias (1975), 50  A .L .J.R . 402 (H .C.). 
MSupra, footnote 2, at 4 0 6 -407 .
83(4th ed.), Vol. 28 , para. 6 8 5 , at 309.
»R .S .A  1980, c. L -15 as am ., ss. 6 , 57.
87R.S.M . 1970, c. L I 50  as am ., s. 7.
“ R .S .P .E .L  1974, c. S-7 as am ., s. 3.
»»R.S.S. 1978, c. L-15 as am . s. 4.
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W h ere th e existen ce o f  a cause o f  action has been concealed by frau d  o f  the  
person setting up this Part o r  Part II as a defence, the cause o f  action shall be 
deem ed to have arisen when the frau d was first known o r discovered .
Such provisions are probably not essential because o f  a doctrine o f  frau d ­
ulent concealm ent in equity90 but it is a good idea to give statutory effect 
to the doctrine so as to resolve any doubts as to its existence and exten t.91
T h re e  provinces have am ended their statutes o f  lim itation to enact 
broader statutory reform s. In Nova Scotia, the court has the power to 
disallow a defence based on a tim e lim itation and allow an action to proceed 
if  it appears equitable to do so having regard to the extent to which (1) the 
time lim itation prejudices the p laintiff and (2) the disallowance o f  the time 
limitation would prejudice the d efend ant.92 In reaching its decision, the 
court must take into account all circum stances o f  the case including “the 
length o f  and the reasons for the delay on the part o f  the p la in tiff ’. An 
obvious exam ple o f  a situation requiring the court to exercise its discretion 
is where a p la in tiff has no reason to know that he has a cause o f  action 
because the dam age su ffered  was latent. It should be noted that the court 
cannot exercise its discretion where the action is brou ght m ore than four 
years after the expiry o f  the limitation period in question.
In M anitoba, the cou rt may grant leave to an applicant to com m ence 
an action, even though the lim itation period would otherw ise have expired , 
if  it is satisfied that not m ore than twelve m onths have elapsed between 
the date on which the applicant knew or should have known o f  all the 
m aterial facts o f  a decisive quality on which the action is based and the date 
on which the application was m ade to the court.93 Again, it is quite clear 
that the provisions are aim ed in large m easure at protecting  the p laintiff 
against the hidden cause o f  action. No leave can be granted  m ore than 
thirty years after the occurrence o f  the acts or om issions giving rise to the 
cause o f  action in question.
T h e  provisions in British Colum bia are d ifferent from  those in the 
other two provinces in that no jud icial discretion is involved; but again it 
is clear that they are directed at the problem  o f  the hidden cause o f  action. 
Subsections 6(3) and (4) o f  the British Colum bia statute94 provide as follows:
6 (3 ) T h e  ru n n in g o f  tim e with resp ect to the limitation periods fixed by this
A ct for an action
(a) for personal injury;
(b) for d am age to p rop erty ;
90Vitnneau v. Solicitor, supra, footnote 25.
9lKing v. Victor Parsons (d Co., [1973] 1 All E .R . 20 6  (C .A .) illustrates the breadth o f  the doctrine.
^ R .S .N .S . 1967, c. 168 as am ., s 2A.
9,R .S.M . 1970, c. L 150  as am ., part II .
«R.S.B .C . 1979, c. 236 as am.
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(c) for professional negligence;
(d) based on frau d  o r  deceit;
(e) in which m aterial facts relating to the cause o f  action have been 
wilfully con cealed ;
(f) fo r relief from  th e coi.seouen ces o f  a mistake
(g) b rou gh t u n d er the Farii!y  C om pen sation  A ct; o r
(h) for breach  o f  trust not vithin subsection ( 1)
is postponed and tim e does not com m en ce to run against a plaintiff until 
the identity o f  th e d efen d an t is known to him and those facts within his 
m eans o f  know ledge are  such th at a reasonable m an, knowing those facts 
and having taken the ap p ro p riate  advice a reasonable m an would seek 
on those facts, would regard  those facts as showing that
(i) an  action on th e cause o f  action would, ap art from  the effect o f  the  
exp iration  o f  a lim itation period , have a reasonable prospect o f  suc­
cess; and
(j) the person whose m eans o f  know ledge is in question ou ght, in his 
own interests and taking his circu m stan ces into accou n t, to be able 
to  bring an  action.
6 (4 ) F o r  the pu rp ose o f  subsection (3),
(a) “ap p ro p riate  advice”, in relation to facts, m eans the advice o f  co m ­
petent persons, qualified in th eir respective fields, to advise in the 
m edical, legal and o th er aspects o f  the facts, as the case may require;
(b) “facts” include
(i) the existen ce o f  a duty ow ed to the plaintiff by the defen d an t; 
and
(ii) that a b reach  o f  a duty caused injury, dam age o r  loss to the  
plaintiff;
(c) w here a person claim s th ro u gh  a predecessor in right, title o r  interest, 
the know ledge o r  m eans o f  know ledge o f  the predecessor before the  
righ t, title o r  interest passed is that o f  the first m entioned person;
(d) w here a question arises as to the knowledge o r  m eans o f  knowledge 
o f  a deceased  person, the co u rt m ay have reg ard  to the con d u ct and  
statem ents o f  the deceased person.
T h e  ultim ate lim itation period in British  Colum bia is thirty years from  the 
time the cause o f  action arose, except in the case o f  hospitals and medical 
practitioners w here it is six years.95
Som e provinces have dealt with the problem  o f  the hidden cause o f  
action in special situations. T h u s, s. 17 o f  O ntario ’s Health Disciplines Act,96 
for exam ple, deals with actions against dentists, doctors, nurses, opto­
metrists and pharm acists by providing for a one year limitation period to 
run from  the date when the p lain tiff “knew or ought to have known the 
fact or facts upon which he alleges negligence or m alpractice”. N ew found­
land’s Law Society Act, 1 9 7 797 deals with actions against solicitors by providing 
in s. 95  for a two year lim itation period for actions for professional neg-
^ R .S .O . 1980, c. 196. See generally G .S . Sharpie, “Periods o f  Lim itation and Medical M alpractice: A New 
Act for O n tario” (1975 ), 23 Chitty's L .J. 145.
951 bid., s. 8(1).
97S.N. 1977, c. 77.
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ligence to run “from  the date when the cause o f  action fo r negligence 
becam e known to the person affected  thereby”. U nfortunately , this pro­
gressive provision is restricted by the laying down in the same section o f  
an ultim ate lim itation period o f  “fou r years from  the date when the profes­
sional services giving rise to the action term inated ”.
In som e provinces statutory reform s have been proposed, although 
not yet im plem ented, to deal with the problem  o f  the hidden cause o f  
action.98 T h e  only way to place the law o f  lim itations on a rational footing 
is by statutory change. H opefully, it will not be too long before all the 
C anadian provinces have reform ed  their laws on lim itation o f  actions. I f  
such action is taken, the way in which a p lain tiff can and does fram e his 
cause o f  action will no longer have such a significant bearing upon the 
running o f  lim itation periods.
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